Toxicity Bounds for Dynamic Liquidation Incentives

Alexander McFarlane

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Abstract: We derive a slippage-aware toxicity condition for on-chain liquidations executed via a constant-product automated market maker (CP-AMM). For a fixed (constant) liquidation incentive $i$, the familiar toxicity frontier $\nu

Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-mac
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