The Strength of Local Structures in Decentralized Network Formation

Jose M. Betancourt

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study dynamic network formation games in which agents assign arbitrary values to network structures. Any such game admits an equivalent representation in terms of the values agents assign to its sub-structures, linking local valuations to equilibrium behavior. The game is a potential game precisely when all participants in a structure value it equally, yielding a closed-form stationary distribution. When valuations are restricted to a finite set of repeated sub-structures, or motifs, the model exhibits phase transitions: small changes in motif values cause discontinuous shifts in network density.

Date: 2025-10
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