Characterizing the ELS Values with Fixed-Population Invariance Axioms

Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, Satoshi Nakada and Yuki Tamura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study efficient, linear, and symmetric (ELS) values, a central family of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable-utility (TU-games) that includes the Shapley value, the CIS value, and the ENSC value. We first show that every ELS value can be written as the Shapley value of a suitably transformed TU-game. We then introduce three types of invariance axioms for fixed player populations. The first type consists of composition axioms, and the second type is active-player consistency. Each of these two types yields a characterization of a subclass of the ELS values that contains the family of least-square values. Finally, the third type is nullified-game consistency: we define three such axioms, and each axiom yields a characterization of one of the Shapley, CIS, and ENSC values.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.04996 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2511.04996

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().