How Fixed-Amount Transactions and Liquidity Constraints Amplify Wealth Inequality: A Kinetic Model Deviating from the Maximum Entropy Benchmark

Jihyuan Liuh

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper investigates the emergence of wealth inequality through a minimalist kinetic exchange model that incorporates two fundamental economic features: fixed-amount transactions and hard budget constraints. In contrast to the maximum entropy principle, which predicts an exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution with moderate inequality for unconstrained wealth exchange, we demonstrate that these realistic trading rules drive the system toward a highly unequal steady state. We develop a self-consistent mean-field theory, deriving a master equation where agent income follows a Poisson process coupled to the poverty rate. Numerical solution reveals a stationary distribution characterized by a substantial pauper class, high Gini coefficient, and exponential tail--significantly deviating from the maximum entropy benchmark. Agent-based simulations confirm these findings. We identify the poverty trap as the key mechanism: the liquidity constraint creates asymmetric economic agency, where zero-wealth agents become passive recipients, unable to participate in wealth circulation. This work establishes that substantial inequality can emerge spontaneously from equal-opportunity exchanges under basic economic constraints, without requiring agent heterogeneity or multiplicative advantage, providing a mechanistic foundation for understanding poverty as an emergent property of exchange rules.

Date: 2025-11
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