Heterogeneity in peer effects for binary outcomes

Mathieu Lambotte

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I introduce heterogeneity into the analysis of peer effects that arise from conformity, allowing the strength of the taste for conformity to vary across agents' actions. Using a structural model based on a simultaneous network game with incomplete information, I derive conditions for equilibrium uniqueness and for the identification of heterogeneous peer-effect parameters. I also propose specification tests to determine whether the conformity model or the spillover model is consistent with the observed data in the presence of heterogeneous peer effects. Applying the model to data on smoking and alcohol consumption among secondary school students, I show that assuming a homogeneous preference for conformity leads to biased estimates.

Date: 2025-11, Revised 2025-11
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