Financial Information Theory
Miquel Noguer i Alonso
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
This paper introduces a comprehensive framework for Financial Information Theory by applying information-theoretic concepts such as entropy, Kullback-Leibler divergence, mutual information, normalized mutual information, and transfer entropy to financial time series. We systematically derive these measures with complete mathematical proofs, establish their theoretical properties, and propose practical algorithms for estimation. Using S&P 500 data from 2000 to 2025, we demonstrate empirical usefulness for regime detection, market efficiency testing, and portfolio construction. We show that normalized mutual information (NMI) behaves as a powerful, bounded, and interpretable measure of temporal dependence, highlighting periods of structural change such as the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 shock. Our entropy-adjusted Value at Risk, information-theoretic diversification criterion, and NMI-based market efficiency test provide actionable tools for risk management and asset allocation. We interpret NMI as a quantitative diagnostic of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and demonstrate that information-theoretic methods offer superior regime detection compared to traditional autocorrelation- or volatility-based approaches. All theoretical results include rigorous proofs, and empirical findings are validated across multiple market regimes spanning 25 years of daily returns.
Date: 2025-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2511.16339
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