Realistic gossip in Trust Game on networks: the GODS model

Jan Majewski and Francesca Giardini

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Gossip has been shown to be a relatively efficient solution to problems of cooperation in reputation-based systems of exchange, but many studies don't conceptualize gossiping in a realistic way, often assuming near-perfect information or broadcast-like dynamics of its spread. To solve this problem, we developed an agent-based model that pairs realistic gossip processes with different variants of Trust Game. The results show that cooperators suffer when local interactions govern spread of gossip, because they cannot discriminate against defectors. Realistic gossiping increases the overall amount of resources, but is more likely to promote defection. Moreover, even partner selection through dynamic networks can lead to high payoff inequalities among agent types. Cooperators face a choice between outcompeting defectors and overall growth. By blending direct and indirect reciprocity with reputations we show that gossiping increases the efficiency of cooperation by an order of magnitude.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-soc
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