Local unanimity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Xinquan Hu and Jun Zhang

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Abstract: In the housing market model introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), we propose a new axiom, local unanimity, that extends the unanimity condition widely used in social choice theory. It applies the unanimity condition to any subset of agents in the model who unanimously agree on the best exchange of their endowments. Building on this axiom, we provide several concise characterizations of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism under both strict and weak preference domains.

Date: 2025-11
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