A choice-based axiomatization of Nash equilibrium

Michele Crescenzi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and expansion consistency properties from the literature on abstract choice theory. The axiomatization applies to Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies alike, to games with strategy sets of any cardinality, and it does not require that players' preferences have a utility or expected utility representation.

Date: 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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