The Moroccan Public Procurement Game

Nizar Riane

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we study the existence of a symmetric mixed strategies Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying the diagonal disjoint payoff matching condition.

Date: 2025-12, Revised 2025-12
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