Power and Freedom in Mechanisms

Christian Basteck and Ulysse Lojkine

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her freedom, and to the influence on outcomes relevant for other agents as her power over others. The framework generalises both the notion of opportunity set from the freedom of choice literature, and established power indices for binary voting. It identifies constrained efficient mechanisms as those that maximise agents' freedom. Applying our framework to the analysis of assignment rules, we provide novel characterisations of the top trading cycles rule and bipolar serial dictatorships in terms of their freedom and power properties.

Date: 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.10112 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2512.10112

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().