Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustin G. Bonifacio

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Abstract: In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a relaxed form of strategy-proofness, known as non-obvious manipulability. We show that the combination of efficiency and non-obvious manipulability leads to impossibility results, whereas weakening efficiency to unanimity gives rise to a large family of well-behaved non-obviously manipulable rules.

Date: 2025-12
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