Team Disagreement and Productive Persuasion

Giampaolo Bonomi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study how open disagreement influences team performance in a dynamic production game. Team members can hold different priors about the productivity of the available production technologies. Initial beliefs are common knowledge and updated based on observed production outcomes. We show that when only one technology is available, a player works harder early on when her coworkers are initially more pessimistic about the technology's productivity. Holding average team optimism constant, this force implies that a team's expected output increases in the degree of disagreement of its members. A manager with the task of forming two-member teams from a large workforce maximizes total expected output by matching coworkers' beliefs in a negative assortative way. When alternative, equally good, production technologies are available, a disagreeing team outperforms any like-minded team in terms of average output and team members' welfare.

Date: 2025-12, Revised 2026-01
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