Dynamic Decoupling in Multidimensional Screening

Eric Gao

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study multidimensional sequential screening. A monopolist contracts with an agent endowed with private information about the distribution of their eventual valuations of different goods; a contract is written and the agent reports their initial private information before drawing and reporting their valuations. In these settings, the monopolist frontloads surplus extraction: Any information rents given to the agent to elicit their post-contractual valuations can be extracted in expectation before valuations are drawn. This significantly simplifies the multidimensional screening problem. If the agent's valuations satisfy invariant dependencies (valuations can be dependent across dimensions, but how valuations are coupled cannot vary in their initial private information), the optimal mechanism coincides with independently offering the optimal sequential screening mechanism for each good, regardless of the dependency structure.

Date: 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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