Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs

Navin Kartik, Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are strategic substitutes under a disclosure cost but complements under a concealment cost. Additional senders thus impede any sender's disclosure under a disclosure cost but promote it under a concealment cost. In the former case, a decision maker can be harmed by additional senders, even when senders have opposing interests. The effects under both kinds of message costs turn on how a sender, when concealing his information, expects others' messages to systematically sway the decision maker's belief.

Date: 2026-01
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