BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs

Jason Douglas Todd and Ismar Volic

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over 20,000 internet polls confirms that BallotRank always identifies the Condorcet winner at conventional values of the damping parameter. We also prove that the method satisfies many of the same social choice criteria as other well-known Condorcet completion methods, but it has the advantage of being a natural social welfare function that provides a full ranking of the candidates.

Date: 2026-01, Revised 2026-01
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