I Choose For You: an Experimental Study

Marina Agranov, Federico Echenique and Kota Saito

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We investigate whether risk and time preferences differ when individuals make decisions for others compared to making decisions for themselves. We introduce a novel ``skin in the game'' experimental design, where choices for others incur a direct cost to the decision-maker, ensuring a genuine trade-off between self-interest and surrogate allocation. The modal outcome is that participants are more risk-averse and impatient when choosing for others than for themselves. Our methodology reveals significant heterogeneity, successfully identifying selfish types often missed by the more standard ``no skin in the game'' approaches. The message is nuanced, as even non-selfish participants behave differently when they have skin in the game. Furthermore, our framework yields more consistent behavior and superior out-of-sample predictive power.

Date: 2026-01
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