Pairwise Beats All-at-Once: Behavioral Gains from Sequential Choice Presentation

Dipankar Das

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper presents the Sequential Rationality Hypothesis, which argues that consumers are better able to make utility-maximizing decisions when products appear in sequential pairwise comparisons rather than in simultaneous multi-option displays. Although this involves higher cognitive costs than the all-at-once format, the current digital market, with its diverse products listed by review ratings, pricing, and paid products, often creates inconsistent choices. The present work shows that preparing the list sequentially supports more rational choice, as the consumer tries to minimize cognitive costs and may otherwise make an irrational decision. If the decision remains the same on both offers, then that is a consistent preference. The platform uses this approach by reducing cognitive costs while still providing the list in an all-at-once format rather than sequentially. To show how sequential exposure reduces cognitive overload and prevents context-dependent errors, we develop a bounded attention model and extend the monotonic attention rule of the random attention model to theorize the sequential rational hypothesis. Using a theoretical design with common consumer goods, we test these hypotheses. This theoretical model helps policymakers in digital market laws, behavioral economics, marketing, and digital platform design consider how choice architectures may improve consumer choices and encourage rational decision-making.

Date: 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm and nep-neu
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