Obviously Strategy-Proof Multi-Dimensional Allocation and the Value of Choice

Quitz\'e Valenzuela-Stookey

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Abstract: A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private information. The principal is constrained by the fact that each agent has the right to demand some status-quo task assignment. I characterize the conditions under which the principal can gain by delegating some control over the assignment to the agents. Within a large class of delegation mechanisms, I then characterize those that are obviously strategy-proof (OSP), and provide guidance for choosing among OSP mechanisms.

Date: 2026-01
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