Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization

David Lancashire

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Achieving incentive compatibility under informational decentralization is impossible within the class of direct and revelation-equivalent mechanisms typically studied in economics and computer science. We show that these impossibility results are conditional by identifying a narrow class of non-revelation-equivalent mechanisms that sustain enforcement by inferring preferences indirectly through parallel, uncorrelatable games.

Date: 2026-02
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