Trimming of extreme votes and favoritism: Evidence from the field

Alex Krumer, Felix Otto and Tim Pawlowski

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Despite a large body of theoretical literature on voting mechanisms, there is no documented evidence from real-world panel evaluations about the effect of trimming the extreme votes on sincere voting. We provide the first such evidence by comparing subjective evaluations of experts from different countries in competitive settings with and without a trimming mechanism. In these evaluations, some of the evaluated subjects are experts' compatriots. Using data on 29,383 subjective evaluations, we find that experts assign significantly higher scores to their compatriots in panels without trimming. However, in panels with trimming, this favoritism is generally insignificant.

Date: 2026-02
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