Almost sure null bankruptcy of testing-by-betting strategies

Hongjian Wang, Shubhada Agrawal and Aaditya Ramdas

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Abstract: The bounded mean betting procedure serves as a crucial interface between the domains of (1) sequential, anytime-valid statistical inference, and (2) online learning and portfolio selection algorithms. While recent work in both domains has established the exponential wealth growth of numerous betting strategies under any alternative distribution, the tightness of the inverted confidence sets, and the pathwise minimax regret bounds, little has been studied regarding the asymptotics of these strategies under the null hypothesis. Under the null, a strategy induces a wealth martingale converging to some random variable that can be zero (bankrupt) or non-zero (non-bankrupt, e.g. when it eventually stops betting). In this paper, we show the conceptually intuitive but technically nontrivial fact that these strategies (universal portfolio, Krichevsky-Trofimov, GRAPA, hedging, etc.) all go bankrupt with probability one, under any non-degenerate null distribution. Part of our analysis is based on the subtle almost sure divergence of various sums of $\sum O_p(n^{-1})$ type, a result of independent interest. We also demonstrate the necessity of null bankruptcy by showing that non-bankrupt strategies are all improvable in some sense. Our results significantly deepen our understanding of these betting strategies as they qualify their behavior on "almost all paths", whereas previous results are usually on "all paths" (e.g. regret bounds) or "most paths" (e.g. concentration inequalities and confidence sets).

Date: 2026-02
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