Screening in digital monopolies

Pietro Dall'Ara and Elia Sartori

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Abstract: A defining feature of digital goods is that replication and degradation are costless: once a high-quality good is produced, low-quality versions can be created and distributed at no additional cost. This paper studies quality-based screening in markets for digital goods, exploring how the insights of the canonical model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) change when production costs are nonseparable and, instead, depend only on the highest quality developed. The monopolist allocation exhibits two interdependent inefficiencies. First, a productive inefficiency arises: the monopolist underinvests in the highest quality relative to the efficiency benchmark. Second, due to a distributional inefficiency, certain buyers receive degraded versions of the produced good. Competition exacerbates productive inefficiency, but improves distributional efficiency relative to monopoly.

Date: 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-mic
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