Simple vs. Optimal Congestion Pricing

Devansh Jalota, Sharon Di and Adam N. Elmachtoub

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Congestion pricing has emerged as an effective tool for mitigating traffic congestion, yet implementing welfare or revenue-optimal dynamic tolls is often impractical. Most real-world congestion pricing deployments, including New York City's recent program, rely on significantly simpler, often static, tolls. This discrepancy motivates the question of how much revenue and welfare loss there is when real-world traffic systems use static rather than optimal dynamic pricing. We address this question by analyzing the performance gap between static (simple) and dynamic (optimal) congestion pricing schemes in two canonical frameworks: Vickrey's bottleneck model with a public transit outside option and its city-scale extension based on the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD). In both models, we first characterize the revenue-optimal static and dynamic tolling policies, which have received limited attention in prior work. In the worst-case, revenue-optimal static tolls achieve at least half of the dynamic optimal revenue and at most twice the minimum achievable system cost across a wide range of practically relevant parameter regimes, with stronger and more general guarantees in the bottleneck model than in the MFD model. We further corroborate our theoretical guarantees with numerical results based on real-world datasets from the San Francisco Bay Area and New York City, which demonstrate that static tolls achieve roughly 80-90% of the dynamic optimal revenue while incurring at most a 8-20% higher total system cost than the minimum achievable system cost.

Date: 2026-02
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