Delegation and Verification Under AI

Lingxiao Huang, Wenyang Xiao and Nisheeth K. Vishnoi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces *phase transitions*, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability.

Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain and nep-mac
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