Candidate Moderation under Instant Runoff and Condorcet Voting: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Study

David McCune, Matthew I. Jones, Andy Schultz, Adam Graham-Squire, Ismar Volic, Belle See, Karen Xiao and Malavika Mukundan

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Abstract: This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in "Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?". Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from the Cooperative Election Survey (CES) to examine how instant-runoff voting (IRV) and Condorcet methods promote candidate moderation. Their model assumes an idealized electoral environment in which all voters possess complete information regarding candidates' ideological positions, all voters provide complete preference rankings, etc. Under these assumptions, their results indicate that Condorcet methods tend to yield winners who are substantially more moderate than those produced by IRV. We construct new models based on CES data which take into account more realistic voter behavior, such as the presence of partial ballots. Our general finding is that under more realistic models the differences between Condorcet methods and IRV largely disappear, implying that in real-world settings the moderating effect of Condorcet methods may not be nearly as strong as what is suggested by more theoretical models.

Date: 2026-03, Revised 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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