Hippocratic Utility

Tomasz Strzalecki

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A utility function has been proposed that values more those lives that are saved by not imposing a harmful treatment and values less those lives that could be saved by treating people who would otherwise die. I do not dispute the ethical motivation behind this kind of asymmetry. However, as my example illustrates, the scope of applicability of such a decision criterion may be limited.

Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-upt
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