Multiplicity of Equilibria in the War of Attrition with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

Martin Castillo-Quintana and Gianfranco Miranda-Romero

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The war of attrition with two-sided asymmetric information is a foundational model in political economy, yet it generically admits a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria. This paper characterizes the sources of equilibrium multiplicity. We identify conditions on the type distribution that determine which form of multiplicity arises: when the lower limit of the hazard potential -- the integral of the hazard rate normalized by type -- diverges, the free parameter is the relative aggressiveness of strategies; when that limit is finite, the free parameter is the mass of types conceding immediately. We prove that the Amann-Leininger payoff perturbation and the introduction of behavioral types -- two seemingly distinct refinements -- are mathematically equivalent and succeed in selecting a unique equilibrium if and only if the type support is bounded. For unbounded supports, multiplicity persists. These results provide guidance for applied theorists: choosing distributions with bounded support ensures existing refinements deliver unique predictions.

Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.13634 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2603.13634

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().