Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default

Parikshit De, Abinash Panda and Anup Pramanik

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Abstract: We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules.

Date: 2026-03
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