Random Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences

Bill Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a widely used characterization of similarity in rankings, even a weak correlation in preferences guarantees assortative matching with high probability as the market size tends to infinity. It follows that the men's average ranking of women and the women's average ranking of men are asymptotically equivalent in all stable matchings with high probability, as long as the market imbalance is not too extreme.

Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.24526 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2603.24526

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().