Condorcet-loser dominance among scoring rules

Ryoga Doi and Kensei Nakamura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates (CL-dominates) another scoring rule $g$ if the set of profiles where $f$ selects a Condorcet loser is a proper subset of the set where $g$ does. We show that the Borda rule not only CL-dominates all other scoring rules, but also is the only scoring rule that CL-dominates some scoring rule.

Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2604.05916 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2604.05916

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().