Balanced Contributions in Networks and Games with Externalities

Frank Huettner

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: For networks with externalities, where each component's worth may depend on the full network structure, balanced contributions and fairness lead to distinct component-efficient allocation rules. We characterize the unique component-efficient allocation rule satisfying balanced contributions -- the BCE rule. Existence is the main challenge: balanced contributions must hold on every edge, but the construction uses only spanning-tree edges. A cycle-sum identity bridges this gap by reducing balanced contributions on non-tree edges to relations in proper subnetworks. The BCE rule coincides with the Myerson value for TU games and with its generalization by Jackson--Wolinsky for network games without externalities, it recovers the externality-free value on the complete network, and -- unlike the fairness-based FCE rule -- it does not reduce to a graph-free formula applied to the graph-restricted game.

Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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