A Theory of Covenant Accounting Adjustment

Pingyang Gao, Xu Jiang and Jinzhi Lu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop an incomplete-contracting model with accounting-based covenants to study how covenant accounting adjustments are made and what properties they exhibit. Standard accounting rules (e.g., GAAP) can generate false-alarm errors or undue-optimism errors. The manager can exert costly effort to privately identify these errors and propose adjustments. If errors are not corrected, control rights may be inefficiently allocated, leading to costly renegotiation. We show that (1) adjustments always correct false-alarm errors, but correct undue-optimism errors only when their magnitude is small; and (2) the manager may expend socially wasteful effort to identify these errors. The model yields testable empirical predictions and policy implications.

Date: 2026-04
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