Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities

Francesco Giordano

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of finitely many random variables and form beliefs by maximum-entropy inference. We obtain two characterizations. When message spaces are unrestricted, implementable outcomes coincide with jointly coherent outcomes, expanding the set of correlated equilibria. With canonical mechanisms, implementability reduces to a single cross-entropy condition: the target outcome must lie on the cross-entropy level set of some correlated equilibrium that passes through that equilibrium itself. Examples and several classes of games illustrate the reach of the framework.

Date: 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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