Efficient liability assignment under shock propagation

Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Leth Hougaard, Kohmei Makihara and Alexandros Rigos

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Abstract: We study a model in which shocks propagate along a path chosen by agents embedded in a network. When a shock hits an agent, the affected agent cancels one of her outgoing edges. This cancellation cascades sequentially along a chosen path until reaching a terminal agent, resulting in a systemic cost equal to the sum of individual cancellation losses. A liability rule determines agent payments for realized losses, and we seek to implement efficient path selection in the induced sequential-move game. Our main axiomatic result characterizes a family of rules, which set each agent's liability to be proportional to the system's total realized losses with agent weights depending only on the network structure. We propose a way to set such weights based on a simple path-based procedure that assigns equal importance to all non-sink agents along each path and then aggregates these contributions across paths. These weights coincide with the Shapley value of an associated "path-counting" cooperative game and can be computed in polynomial time. A simulation study illustrates the mechanics of our approach.

Date: 2026-05
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