The Ethics of LLM Sandbox and Persona Dynamics

Tim Gebbie and Stewart Gebbie

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: It is well known that LLM guardrails and trained persona dynamics can produce a reality gap: the distance between the world a LLM is permitted or shaped to describe, and the world in which users must act. Here we argue that actively generating reality gaps is in fact unethical because it knowingly shifts epistemic risk back to the uninformed user -- this is reality laundering. This can potentially cause harm when operationalised at scale. The risk is sharpest in high-exposure advice contexts, where users seek orientation rather than a bounded, externally checkable task. Guardrails naively appear ethically necessary when they claim to prevent direct harm, but often become suspect when they suppress truthful perception and launder uncomfortable mechanisms into acceptable abstractions. Basel-style financial regulation, B-BBEE-style compliance, Societe Generale, and the London Whale show how formal safety systems can become legible, gameable, and performative while real exposure migrates elsewhere. The same pattern can appear in LLMs as moral compliance: safe language, distorted reality. We therefore distinguish refusing harm, from refusing reality; and then argue for top-down causal requirements specification at the task level rather than bottom-up moral correction at the response or sandbox level. Persona dynamics matter because the assistant interface is not neutral; it shapes how uncertainty, conflict, authority, and risk are staged. The conclusion is that so-called ``ethical AI'' becomes substantively unethical when it substitutes institutional reassurance for contact with reality.

Date: 2026-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.28647 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2605.28647

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().