Obviously Strategy-proof Choice of Social Acts

Abinash Panda and Anup Pramanik

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study obviously strategy-proof implementation in the framework of social choice over acts introduced by Bahel and Sprumont (2020). We characterize the class of unanimous social choice functions that are implementable via obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. Our main result shows that a unanimous social choice function is obviously strategy-proof implementable if and only if it is dictatorial.

Date: 2026-05
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