On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions

Kiho Yoon

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study optimal auction design when the direction of bidders' deviations is restricted. We show that the optimal revenue when bidders can only underbid their true values cannot exceed the optimal revenue when bidders may freely underbid or overbid. Thus, unidirectional incentive compatibility is sufficient for full incentive compatibility for revenue maximization. We prove this equivalence through linear programming duality in a discrete model, which makes it possible to analyze the feasibility of allocation rules in multi-agent environments.

Date: 2026-06
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