Mind the Gap in the Mining Game

Kyoung-Kuk Kim and Donghwa Seo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze intentional block delays (mining gaps) in Proof-of-Work blockchain systems, where miners strategically balance mining rewards against operational costs. Using a game-theoretic model, we derive a Nash equilibrium with optimal mining strategies and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for mining gap existence. We demonstrate that mining gaps, when combined with difficulty adjustment algorithms, can destabilize the system. We propose conditions to address sustainability concerns as block rewards decrease and reliance on transaction fees increases. Our findings are illustrated through a two-player game simulation and an analysis of the Bitcoin network, providing insights for blockchain design and policy. This work contributes to understanding strategic mining behavior and its impact on blockchain stability and efficiency.

Date: 2026-06
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Published in Quantitative Finance 26(2), 213-233 (2025)

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