The Winner's Bliss in Common-Value Auctions under Horizontal Differentiation

Jiawei Chen, Anh Nguyen and Matthew Shum

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study common-value auctions in which bidders have horizontally differentiated preferences. In a specific two-bidder parameterization, winning conveys good news about the object's value to the winner, a phenomenon we call the winner's bliss in contrast to the conventional winner's curse. Additional implications also differ from the conventional analysis. When bidders' preferences are horizontally differentiated, seller revenue is reduced with information disclosure, and advantageous selection sustains bilateral trade under asymmetric information.

Date: 2026-06
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