A Note on Learnable Nash Equilibrium

Songzi Du

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A Nash equilibrium is learnable if there exists a myopic adjustment dynamic for which it is asymptotically stable. In generic symmetric two-player games, a Nash equilibrium is learnable if and only if it has index +1.

Date: 2026-06
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