Settlement Manipulation in Prediction Markets

David Dai, Ruizhe Jia and Shihao Yu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Prediction markets increasingly list contracts settling on an asset price that holders can move by trading the underlying. We build a model showing that such contracts transfer wealth from prediction-market liquidity traders to manipulators and harm price discovery in the underlying, even as it becomes more liquid. After the launch of Polymarket's five-minute Bitcoin contract, settlement-time spot order flow spikes, causing large price reversals after settlement. Manipulators capture a large amount of profit, mostly from retail. Manipulation is largely absent in the fifteen-minute contracts: lengthening the contract horizon removes it, providing the market-design remedy our model and evidence support.

Date: 2026-06
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