 Feedback dynamics in matching networks drive behavioral differentiation despite overlapping objectivesAlexandros Gelastopoulos Abstract: Many bipartite social networks exhibit pronounced asymmetries in selectivity and matching opportunities: members of one side can afford to be highly selective, while members of the opposite side are forced to accept less desirable matches. While it is natural to try to explain this asymmetry in terms of the intrinsic characteristics of the two sides or other exogenous factors, here we show that such asymmetries can also emerge endogenously through a feedback process generated by the matching process itself: as one side becomes more selective, the other side is pushed to be less selective due to reduced matching opportunities, and vice versa. We develop a model in which individuals repeatedly form one-to-one matches across two groups and adapt their selectivity to achieve a target matching rate. Using both analytic and numerical methods, we show that when encounters are sufficiently frequent, the unique equilibrium is for one group to be highly selective and the other non-selective. This qualitative outcome holds even for heterogeneous groups with overlapping, almost indistinguishable distributions of target matching rates. The model makes several testable predictions, and it provides a mechanism for behavioral differentiation in repeated matching environments, with applications ranging from online dating to hiring and housing markets. Date: 2026-06 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2606.31802 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Papers from arXiv.org |
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