Comparison games and ranking of players

Daniela Bubboloni and Stefano Moretti

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Abstract: This work addresses the problem of assessing player importance in coalitional settings where the available information concerns the relative strength between pairs of coalitions, rather than the absolute worth of each coalition. We introduce a novel framework that is flexible enough to represent all coalitional pseudo-games and, through the use of coalitional networks, naturally accommodates scenarios with limited or heterogeneous coalition comparisons. Importantly, this framework still enables the computation of semivalues of pseudo-games, such as the Banzhaf and Shapley values, that can be expressed as weighted sums of differences in specific coalition comparisons, thus offering interpretations beyond traditional approaches. Furthermore, for ranking players rather than computing exact numerical attributions, we introduce the concept of a player's score, which simplifies the process of determining rankings based on semivalues, and shifts the perspective from average marginal contribution to average coalitional worth. This turns out to be particularly enlightening for the Banzhaf value.

Date: 2026-06
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