The Impossibility of a Gerrymander-Proof Representative Democracy

John Mori

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A representative democracy is immune to gerrymandering if it satisfies Chambers' (2008) representative consistency. We examine preference aggregation and show that representative consistency is mutually inconsistent with three other normative desiderata -- efficiency, anonymity, and neutrality. We show this impossibility result both in a setting with ordinal preferences and a setting with expected utility preferences.

Date: 2026-07
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