Axioms for Correlated Equilibrium

Florian Brandl

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We characterize correlated equilibrium in finite normal-form games. Interpreting correlated strategies as action recommendations, we show that correlated equilibrium is the unique solution concept that never recommends a pure-strategy dominated action, treats payoff-equivalent actions interchangeably, and respects the sure-thing principle under uncertainty about payoffs and the correlation device. A parallel characterization identifies coarse correlated equilibrium among solution concepts that recommend dominant actions whenever they exist and treat payoff-equivalent actions as strongly interchangeable.

Date: 2026-07
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