Does Financial Trading Smooth Non-Convex Markets?

Nicolas Stevens, Peter Cramton and Martial Toniotti

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In non-convex markets, a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. This turns out to be an important issue in real-world non-convex auction markets, such as electricity markets, as it complicates pricing and requires the auctioneer to resort to out-of-market discriminatory side payments to sustain an equilibrium. We investigate whether the introduction of convex financial trading induces a smoothing effect, mitigating the issues arising from non-convexities. We develop a two-stage non-convex market model (a forward market followed by a spot market) in which convex financial traders participate in the forward market. Our model predicts that financial trading reduces the magnitude of side payments required to support the cleared allocation. To test the prediction of our model, we examine the introduction of a transaction fee on financial traders in 2020 by PJM, the US's largest electricity market. We show that the substantial decline in financial trading volume caused by this policy coincided with a significant increase in side payments, in line with our theoretical predictions.

Date: 2026-07
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