Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem

Özgün Ekici, Sinan Ertemel and M. Bumin Yenmez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not be assigned to an agent who ranks it more highly than another agent unless the latter receives a more preferred object. We show that the set of Rawlsian equitable allocations coincides with the set of stable allocations in an auxiliary market where object priorities depend on agents' preference reports. The agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm computes the agent-optimal element of this set, but no Rawlsian equitable rule is strategy-proof in general.

Date: 2026-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.29080 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2607.29080

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().