Quantum Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Quantum Information Structures in Games

Furkan Sezer

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Bergemann and Morris (2016) show that one information structure is more informative than another exactly when it induces a smaller set of Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes in every game. We build the quantum analogue. An information structure becomes a family of density operators indexed by the payoff state, which the mediator observes. We show that obedience is equivalent to a Loewner domination between operators on one player's subsystem. The equilibrium set is then a nonempty compact spectrahedron computable by semidefinite programming, classical structures embed exactly, and under quantum individual sufficiency more information shrinks the equilibrium set in every game.

Date: 2026-08
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