Optimal Sequential Assignment with Capacity Constrained Verification

Vilok Taori

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Abstract: A principal seeks to allocate $k$ identical objects among n sequentially arriving, impatient agents. Each agent privately observes her valuation, and the principal's payoff from allocating an object depends on the recipient's valuation. The principal can perfectly verify the valuation of at most $m$ agents, where $m

Date: 2026-08
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